

Formal Methods for Cryptography

Santiago Zanella-Béguelin
santiago@microsoft.com

Microsoft®
Research
Cambridge, UK

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<http://easycrypt.gforge.inria.fr/ewscs/>

Solutions

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Lazy solution: Haskell

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Reasoned solution:

$$\binom{6}{4} \left(4 \times 6 \times 5 \times 4 + \binom{4}{2} \times 6 \times 5 \times \binom{4}{2} \right) / 6^6$$

- 2 Design a set of four 6-sided dice d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4 such that d_i rolls higher than d_{i+1} with probability more than $1/2$ for $i = 1, 2, 3$. What is the probability p that d_4 rolls higher than d_1 ? Can you design a set where $p < 1/2$?

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Purple beats Orange with probability $2/3$

Orange beats Red with probability $2/3$

Red beats Green with probability $2/3$

but

Green beats Purple with probability $2/3$!

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
Answer: x is uniformly distributed no matter the distribution of y

- ④ Show by reduction the equivalence between ROR and CPA security for public-key encryption.

Recall the definitions...

Real-or-Random security


Define the experiment ROR:



Advantage of \mathcal{A} : $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{ROR}}^{\mathcal{A}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 2 \Pr[\text{ROR} : b = b'] - 1$

Chosen-plaintext security

Define the experiment CPA:



Advantage of \mathcal{A} : $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{CPA}}^{\mathcal{A}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 2 \Pr[\text{CPA} : b = b'] - 1$

ROR-security is as strong as CPA-security

Given an adversary \mathcal{B} against ROR, construct an adversary \mathcal{A} against CPA with the same advantage:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{A}_1(pk) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (m_0, s) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_1(pk); m_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}; \text{ return } (m_0, m_1, s) \\ \mathcal{A}_2(c, s) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{ return } \mathcal{B}_2(c, s)\end{aligned}$$

CPA-security is almost as strong as ROR-security

Given an adversary \mathcal{A} against CPA, construct an adversary \mathcal{B} against ROR:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{B}_1(pk) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (m_0, m_1, s) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(pk); d \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}; \text{ return } (m_d, s) \\ \mathcal{B}_2(c, s) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} d' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(c, s); \text{ return } (d = d') \end{aligned}$$

Code-Based Cryptographic Proofs



A language-based approach

What if we represent games as programs?

Games	⇒	probabilistic programs
Game transformations	⇒	program transformations
Adversaries	⇒	unspecified procedures
Efficiency	⇒	Probabilistic Polynomial-Time

A language-based approach

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A language-based approach

Security definitions, assumptions and games are formalized using a probabilistic programming language

pWHILE:

\mathcal{C}	::=	skip	nop
		$\mathcal{C}; \mathcal{C}$	sequence
		$\mathcal{V} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}$	assignment
		$\mathcal{V} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{DE}$	random sampling
		if \mathcal{E} then \mathcal{C} else \mathcal{C}	conditional
		while \mathcal{E} do \mathcal{C}	while loop
		$\mathcal{V} \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{E}, \dots, \mathcal{E})$	procedure call

- $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} d$: sample the value of x according to distribution d
- The language of expressions (\mathcal{E}) and distribution expressions (\mathcal{DE}) admits user-defined extensions

Some design choices

- Semantics formalized in the Coq proof assistant
- Deep-embedding
- Strongly-typed language
- Syntax is dependently-typed
(only well-typed programs are admitted)
- Monadic semantics uses C. Paulin's ALEA Coq library

Representation of programs

Deep-embedding in the language of Coq, using a dependently-typed syntax:

Inductive \mathcal{I} : Type :=
| Assign : $\forall t, \mathcal{V}_t \rightarrow \mathcal{E}_t \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$
| Rand : $\forall t, \mathcal{V}_t \rightarrow \mathcal{D}_t \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$
| Cond : $\mathcal{E}_{\mathbb{B}} \rightarrow \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$
| While : $\mathcal{E}_{\mathbb{B}} \rightarrow \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$
| Call : $\forall l t, \mathcal{P}_{(l,t)} \rightarrow \mathcal{V}_t \rightarrow \mathcal{E}_l^* \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$
where $\mathcal{C} := \mathcal{I}^*$

Programs are well-typed by construction

The Sub-Probability Monad

Distributions represented as monotonic, linear and Scott-continuous functions of type

$$\mathcal{D}(A) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (A \rightarrow [0, 1]) \rightarrow [0, 1]$$

Intuition: Given $\mu \in \mathcal{D}(A)$ and $f : A \rightarrow [0, 1]$
 $\mu(f)$ represents the expected value of f w.r.t. μ

$$\begin{aligned} \text{unit} : A &\rightarrow \mathcal{D}(A) && \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda x. \lambda f. f \ x \\ \text{bind} : \mathcal{D}(A) &\rightarrow (A \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(B)) \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(B) && \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda \mu. \lambda F. \lambda f. \mu(\lambda x. F \ x \ f) \end{aligned}$$

Programs map an initial memory to a distribution on final memories

$$\llbracket c \in \mathcal{C} \rrbracket : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{M})$$

The probability of an event is the expected value of its characteristic function:

$$\Pr[c, m : A] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \llbracket c \rrbracket m \mathbb{1}_A$$

Programs that do not terminate absolutely generate sub-distributions with total probability mass < 1

Instrumented and parametrized semantics to characterize PPT:

$$\llbracket c \in \mathcal{C} \rrbracket_{\eta} : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{M} \times \mathbb{N})$$

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Instrumented and **parametrized** semantics to characterize PPT:

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Intuition behind semantics

Think of $\llbracket c \rrbracket m$ as the expectation operator of the probability distribution induced by the game:

$$\llbracket c \rrbracket m f = \sum_{m'} f(m') \Pr[\langle c, m \rangle \Downarrow m']$$

Computing probabilities:

$$\Pr[c, m : A] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \llbracket c \rrbracket m \mathbb{1}_A$$

Example.

Let $c \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}; y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$

$$\Pr[c, m : x \neq y] = \llbracket c \rrbracket m \mathbb{1}_{x \neq y} =$$

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$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[c, m : x \neq y] &= \llbracket c \rrbracket m \mathbb{1}_{x \neq y} = \\ &\frac{1}{4} \mathbb{1}_{x \neq y}(m[x \mapsto 0, y \mapsto 0]) + \frac{1}{4} \mathbb{1}_{x \neq y}(m[x \mapsto 0, y \mapsto 1]) + \\ &\frac{1}{4} \mathbb{1}_{x \neq y}(m[x \mapsto 1, y \mapsto 0]) + \frac{1}{4} \mathbb{1}_{x \neq y}(m[x \mapsto 1, y \mapsto 1]) \end{aligned}$$

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0	+	$\frac{1}{4}$	+
$\frac{1}{4}$	+	0	

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Let $c \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}; y \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$

$$\Pr[c, m : x \neq y] = \llbracket c \rrbracket m \mathbb{1}_{x \neq y} = \frac{1}{2}$$

Deductive reasoning about programs

- Proving programs correct
- Foundations: program logic (Hoare'69) and weakest precondition calculus (Floyd'67)
- Major advances in:
 - language coverage
(functions, objects, concurrency, heap)
 - automation
(decision procedures, SMT solvers, invariant generation)
 - proof engineering
(intermediate languages)

Hoare logic

- Judgments: $c : P \Rightarrow Q$, often noted $\{P\}c\{Q\}$
- Assertions: P, Q are predicates over program states (typically specified as f.o. formulae over program variables)
- Validity: if $(c, m) \Downarrow m'$ and $m \models P$, then $m' \models Q$

Some proof rules

$$\frac{}{x \leftarrow e : Q\{x := e\} \Rightarrow Q} \qquad \frac{c_1 : P \Rightarrow Q \quad c_2 : Q \Rightarrow R}{c_1; c_2 : P \Rightarrow R}$$

$$\frac{c_1 : P \wedge e = \text{tt} \Rightarrow Q \quad c_2 : P \wedge e = \text{ff} \Rightarrow Q}{\text{if } e \text{ then } c_1 \text{ else } c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q}$$

$$\frac{c : I \wedge e = \text{tt} \Rightarrow I \quad P \rightarrow I \quad I \wedge e = \text{ff} \rightarrow Q}{\text{while } e \text{ do } c : P \Rightarrow Q}$$

Verification condition generation

- Generate a set of verification conditions from annotated program and post-condition
- If all VCs are valid and $P \rightarrow wp(c, Q)$ then $C : P \Rightarrow Q$

Selected rules

$$wp(x \leftarrow e, Q) = Q\{x := e\}$$

$$wp(c_1; c_2, R) = wp(c_1, wp(c_2, R))$$

$$wp(\text{if } e \text{ then } c_1 \text{ else } c_2, Q) = e = \text{tt} \rightarrow wp(c_1, Q) \wedge e = \text{ff} \rightarrow wp(c_2, Q)$$

$$wp(\text{while } e \text{ do } c \{I\}, Q) = I$$

The while rule generates two proof obligations

$$I \wedge e = \text{tt} \rightarrow wp(c, I) \quad I \wedge e = \text{ff} \rightarrow Q$$

Relational Hoare logic

- Judgments: $\models c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$
- Assertions: P, Q are binary relations over program states (specified as f.o. formulae over tagged program variables)
- Validity: if $P \models (m_1, m_2)$, $(c_1, m_1) \Downarrow m'_1$ and $(c_2, m_2) \Downarrow m'_2$, then $Q \models (m'_1, m'_2)$
- May require co-termination.

Verification methods

- Embedding into Hoare logic:
 - Self-composition (Barthe et al.'04)
 - Cross-products (Zaks and Pnueli'08, Barthe et al.'11)
- Relational Hoare Logic (Benton'04)

Relational Hoare Logic

Selected rules

$$\frac{\vDash c_1 \sim c_2 : \Psi \Rightarrow \Phi \quad \Psi' \rightarrow \Psi \quad \Phi \rightarrow \Phi'}{\vDash c_1 \sim c_2 : \Psi' \Rightarrow \Phi'} \text{[Sub]}$$

$$\frac{\vDash c_1 \sim c_2 : \Psi \Rightarrow \Phi \quad \vDash c_2 \sim c_3 : \Psi' \Rightarrow \Phi'}{\vDash c_1 \sim c_3 : \Psi \circ \Psi' \Rightarrow \Phi \circ \Phi'} \text{[Comp]}$$

$$\frac{\vDash c_1 \sim c'_1 : \Psi \Rightarrow \Phi' \quad \vDash c_2 \sim c'_2 : \Phi' \Rightarrow \Phi}{\vDash c_1; c_2 \sim c'_1; c'_2 : \Psi \Rightarrow \Phi} \text{[Seq]}$$

$$\frac{}{\vDash x \leftarrow e \sim x \leftarrow e' : \Phi\{x\langle 1 \rangle := e\langle 1 \rangle, x\langle 2 \rangle := e'\langle 2 \rangle\} \Rightarrow \Phi} \text{[Asn]}$$

$$\Psi \rightarrow e\langle 1 \rangle \leftrightarrow e'\langle 2 \rangle$$

$$\frac{\vDash c_1 \sim c'_1 : \Psi \wedge e\langle 1 \rangle \Rightarrow \Phi \quad \vDash c_2 \sim c'_2 : \Psi \wedge \neg e\langle 1 \rangle \Rightarrow \Phi}{\vDash \text{if } e \text{ then } c_1 \text{ else } c_2 \sim \text{if } e' \text{ then } c'_1 \text{ else } c'_2 : \Psi \Rightarrow \Phi} \text{[Cond]}$$

Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic

Probabilistic extension of Benton's Relational Hoare Logic

- Judgments: $\vDash c_1 \sim c_2 : P \Rightarrow Q$
- Assertions: P, Q are binary relations over program states (specified as f.o. formulae over tagged program variables)
- Validity: if $P \vDash (m_1, m_2)$, $\llbracket c_1 \rrbracket m_1 = \mu_1$ and $\llbracket c_2 \rrbracket m_2 = \mu_2$, then $Q^\# \vDash (\mu_1, \mu_2)$

$Q^\#$ lifts relation Q from states to distributions over states

Lifting Relations to Distributions

- Let $\mu_1 \in \mathcal{D}(A), \mu_2 \in \mathcal{D}(B), \Psi \subseteq A \times B$.
- $\Psi^\# \subseteq \mathcal{D}(A) \times \mathcal{D}(B)$ is the smallest relation that satisfies:
 - If $(s, t) \models \Psi$ then $(\text{unit}(s), \text{unit}(t)) \models \Psi^\#$
($\text{unit}(s)$ is the point distribution on s)
 - If $(\mu_i, \nu_i) \models \Psi^\#$ and $\sum_i p_i = 1$, then

$$\left(\sum_i p_i \mu_i, \sum_i p_i \nu_i \right) \models \Psi^\#$$


Lifting Relations to Distributions

Alternatively, $(\mu_1, \mu_2) \models \Psi^\#$ iff there exists $\mu \in \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{B})$ s.t.

- The 1st projection of μ coincides with μ_1
- The 2nd projection of μ coincides with μ_2
- The support of μ is a subset of Ψ

Lifting Relations to Distributions

Alternatively, $(\mu_1, \mu_2) \models \Psi^\#$ iff the maximum flow in the following network is 1:




Example

$$c_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\} \quad c_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}; y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$$

- c_1 generates a distribution μ_1 over $\{0, 1\}$
- c_2 generates a distribution μ_2 over $\{0, 1\}^2$
- Consider $\Psi \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x\langle 1 \rangle = x\langle 2 \rangle \oplus y\langle 2 \rangle$

Q: Does $(\mu_1, \mu_2) \models \Psi^\#$ hold?




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Q: Does $(\mu_1, \mu_2) \models \Psi^\#$ hold?

A: Yes, because we can construct a flow of value 1 in the corresponding network



Exercises

- 1 Define as sugar syntax a statement $\text{assert}(b)$ in pWHILE , that cuts off execution *traces* that do not satisfy b . Hint: define first an abort statement s.t. forall $m : \mathcal{M}$, $f : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow [0, 1]$, $\llbracket \text{abort} \rrbracket m f = 0$.
- 2 Define a uniform denotational semantics for pWHILE :
 $\llbracket c \rrbracket^* : \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{M}) \rightarrow \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{M})$
- 3 We saw during this lecture that the following judgment is valid:

$$\models x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^k; y \leftarrow x \oplus z \simeq_{\{x, y\}}^{\{z\}} y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^k; x \leftarrow y \oplus z$$

Is this stronger judgment valid?

$$\models x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^k; y \leftarrow x \oplus z \simeq_{\{x, y, z\}}^{\{z\}} y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^k; x \leftarrow y \oplus z$$