Algorithmic mechanism design
The main objective of mechanism design is to find good algorithms in environments in which the input is controlled by selfish agents that try to influence the result of the computation to improve their own objective. In this course, we will review some of the fundamental issues of algorithmic mechanism design: truthfulness, mechanisms for optimizing the welfare of participants, mechanisms for optimizing arbitrary objectives and specifically for optimizing the makespan in scheduling, and optimal auctions for optimizing revenue in Bayesian settings.
- E. Koutsoupias. Introduction to algorithmic mechanism design. Lecture slides from EWSCS 2014.
- Videos from the lectures.
- N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, V. V. Vazirani, eds. Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Ch. 9. N. Nisan. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists).
- Ch. 12. R. Lavi. Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms.
- Ch. 13. J. D. Hartline, A. R. Karlin. Profit maximization in mechanism design.
- J. D. Hartline. Approximation in Economic Design. Book draft, 2012. [link]
- G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias. Mechanism design for scheduling. Bull. of EATCS, v. 97, pp. 40-59, 2009. [link to EATCS site]
May 21, 2016 23:44 EET
local organizers, ewscs14(at)cs.ioc.ee
EWSCS'14 page: //cs.ioc.ee/ewscs/2014/